

Chapter I: Educational Theory Approaches in Revision

1. In Search of the Cultivation of the Self

Societies are dynamic. Due to global and domestic political and socioeconomic factors, their composition is not static. The increasing plurality around the globe also creates an increase in options for action and sometimes leads to tensions within society. An unavoidable pluralism of values also has consequences, such as a lack of orientation and uncertainty in the face of diverse and seemingly ambiguous options for action. In Germany, these options have their limits in the *Grundgesetz* (The Basic Law; the German constitution), in a consensus of values and norms that underlie the pluralism of values in a standardising way. The continuous influx of people into Germany since the end of the 1960s, which has been further intensified by refugee movements since 2015 and the war in Ukraine, has put the once valid narrative of an inclusive understanding of “we” and the self-image of a civil society to the test.¹¹ The diversity of behavioural patterns and the increase in different values, which bring with them individual lifestyles and worldviews, lead to con-

11 Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Statistical Office], “In Deutschland arbeiten 7,4 Millionen geringfügig entlohnte Beschäftigte,” *Destatis*, March 15, 2016, https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2016/03/PD16_105_12421.html, accessed 11 October 2018. See also the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)’s 2013/2017 election campaign slogan, “We decide.” In this context, social scientist Naika Foroutan criticises the fact that there was no *education on plurality* during the pluralisation of German society; Naika Foroutan, *Die post-migrantische Gesellschaft. Ein Versprechen der pluralen Demokratie* (Bielefeld, 2019), 127. However, reference can also be made to efforts towards intercultural education and pedagogy, as in Georg Auernheimer, *Einführung in die interkulturelle Erziehung* (Darmstadt, 1990), later revised under the title *Interkulturelle Pädagogik* (Darmstadt, 2015). See also Gogolin and Krüger-Potratz, *Einführung in die interkulturelle Pädagogik*.

flicts and uncertainties that affect all groups in society.¹² However, a pluralism of values, which is enshrined in the *Grundgesetz*, is an essential feature of our political system.¹³ Within this pluralism of values, subjective worldviews can give preference to values that provide orientation but cannot be assumed to be binding for everyone in the public sphere. Nevertheless, there is, of course, a need for a minimum understanding of the rules of social interaction.¹⁴ From a pedagogical point of view, it seems essential that the corresponding communicative competences that are expected in adolescence are initiated in elementary education.

Added to this is the great challenge and developmental task of practising emotional and cognitive skills, such as adopting a social perspective towards the elderly, socioeconomically disadvantaged people, and fellow human beings as a whole, which is a lifelong learning process.¹⁵ As an expression of uncertainty, which coincides with a declining significance of traditions in life, people's sense of self and their and worldviews are becoming noticeably more fragmented.¹⁶ There are a growing number of options for attitudes and behaviour. Added to this are the mechanisation and digitalisation of society, which appear to be progressively alienating people from

-
- 12 Cf. Manon Westphal, "Kritik- und Konfliktkompetenz. Eine demokratietheoretische Perspektive auf das Kontroversitätsgebot," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ)* 13/14 (2018): 12.
 - 13 Cf. Sabine Dengel and Linda Kelch, "'Es ist kompliziert. Dazu guter Pop.' Ambiguität, politische Bildung und Kultur," in *Mehrdeutigkeit gestalten. Ambiguität und die Bildung demokratischer Haltungen in Kunst und Pädagogik*, eds. Ansgar Schnurr et al. (Bielefeldt, 2021), 65.
 - 14 The fact that even such a minimal consensus requires an intensive and continuous social endeavour is often insufficiently reflected upon. Mark Terkessidis emphasises that differences in values can lead to social and political conflicts, especially if they "can no longer be negotiated at the level of the democratic constitutional state." Mark Terkessidis, "Harte Verhandlungen: über die Wertpluralität in einer Gesellschaft der Vielfalt," in *Werte – und was sie uns wert sind. Eine interdisziplinäre Anthologie*, eds. Randolf Rodenstock and Nese Sevsay-Tegethoff (Munich, 2018), 117.
 - 15 Cf. Bardo Herzig, *Förderung ethischer Urteils- und Orientierungsfähigkeit. Grundlagen und schulische Anwendung* (Münster/New York, 1998), 129; see also Robert L. Selman, *Die Entwicklung des sozialen Verstehens. Entwicklungspsychologische und klinische Untersuchungen* (Frankfurt, 1984), 47ff.
 - 16 Jörg Zirfas and Benjamin Jörissen, *Phänomenologien der Identität. Human-, sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche Analysen* (Wiesbaden, 2007), 127.

one another and increasing anonymity within an individual's environment despite interdependence.¹⁷

Individuation processes and individualisation discourses are on the rise and require people to find orientation and meaning for their own lives, for which the body is a visualisation medium and resource that lends itself extraordinarily well.¹⁸ Over the last few decades, the body has been revalued, and it has become a project of intensive design, which extends to self-practices of physical perfection, self-staging, and presentation in public.¹⁹ The mediatisation of lifeworlds has led to, among other things, a visualisation of one's own person via the body, which has become the subject of negotiations of gender, for example.²⁰ "How 'one' lives, what 'one' does, how 'one' looks and whether 'one' is in shape becomes an essential part of this larger commodification process."²¹ The preoccupation with the body is now recognisable not only as an integral part of a political analysis of modern societies but also of social and educational theories.²²

17 Cf. Peter V. Zima, *Entfremdung. Pathologien der postmodernen Gesellschaft* (Paderborn, 2017), 8, 94. Anonymity and individualisation have taken on a different character, especially after the coronavirus pandemic.

18 Tanja Thomas and Tanja Maier, "Körper," in *Handbuch Cultural Studies und Medienanalyse*, eds. Andreas Hepp et al. (Wiesbaden, 2015), 286.

19 Self practices enable the individual, "by his own efforts or with the help of others, to perform a series of operations on his body or soul, his thinking, his behaviour and his mode of existence, with the aim of changing himself in such a way that he attains a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality." Michel Foucault, "Technologien des Selbst," in *Technologien des Selbst*, eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Frankfurt 1993), 26 ff. Cf. Robert Gugutzer, *Soziologie des Körpers* (Bielefeld, 2004), 40.

20 Cf. Elke Grittmann et al., "Körperbilder – Körperpraktiken. Visualisierung und Vergeschlechtlichung von Körpern in Medienkulturen," in *Körperbilder – Körperpraktiken. Visualisierung und Vergeschlechtlichung von Körpern in Medienkulturen*, eds. Elke Grittmann et al., (Cologne, 2018), 10.

21 Christian Schwarenegger, Jakob Hörtnagel, and Lena Erber, "Straffer Körper, gutes Leben? Fitnessinhalte auf Instagram zwischen Ideal und Selbst und deren Aneignung durch junge Frauen," in *Körperbilder – Körperpraktiken*, eds. Grittmann et al., 76.

22 Cf. Maren Möhring, "Die Regierung der Körper. 'Gouvernementalität' und 'Techniken des Selbst,'" *Zeithistorische Forschungen* 2, 3 (2006): 285; cf. Eva Kimminich et al., forward to *Express Yourself! Europas kulturelle Kreativität zwischen Markt und Underground* (Bielefeld, 2007), 8. See also Grittmann et al., *Körperbilder – Körperpraktiken*.

People can follow particular and selective—if possible, expedient — motives when weighing to whom they should behave in a just or caring manner.²³ Particularly in times of economic uncertainty, tensions between social classes, and political upheavals, there is an increase in discriminatory behaviour towards people with a migrant background.²⁴ For some years now, it has not only been Muslims who have increasingly been the focus of discrimination, but also Black people, Jewish people, and refugees.²⁵ These circumstances call for a serious discourse on concepts of educational theory that relate to the everyday lives of people who want to shape their lives meaningfully in this “new” world and must do so to maintain a positive self-image. As humankind, responsibility and solidarity are not easy to organise, realize, and ensure in society; it is not only every individual who is called upon to act, but also social groups, such as religious communities.²⁶

A certain decline in values is often cited as the cause of the decreasing quality of interpersonal interactions.²⁷ In the literature, value pluralism in connection with ethnic origin and religious affiliation is often blamed for people’s feelings of insecurity.²⁸ However, it was not only in connection with immigration that values such as discipline, loyalty, order, family, abortion, and a sense of duty were

23 See Philipp Mayring, “Individuelle und situative Bedingungsfaktoren für Wohlbefinden – Ergebnisse psychologischer Glücksforschung,” in *Orte des guten Lebens. Entwürfe humaner Lebensräume*, ed. Hans-Peter Ecker (Würzburg 2007), 58 ff.

24 Cf. Barbara Sutter, *Der Wille zur Gesellschaft. Bürgerschaftliches Engagement und die Transformation des Sozialen* (Cologne, 2018), 18ff., 131ff.

25 See Peter Antes and Rauf Ceylan (eds.), *Muslimen in Deutschland. Historische Bestandsaufnahme, aktuelle Entwicklungen und zukünftige Forschungsfragen* (Wiesbaden, 2017), 7–76. For the context of the USA, see Martha Nussbaum, *Die neue religiöse Intoleranz. Ein Ausweg aus der Politik der Angst* (Darmstadt, 2014), 52.

26 When people experience the limits of structural coping with situations and emergencies, they must take individual and collective responsibility. However, this cannot arise from external coercion but only from human freedom.

27 See Christian Duncker, *Verlust der Werte? Wertewandel zwischen Meinungen und Tatsachen* (Wiesbaden, 2000).

28 Cf. Anna Orkiszewska, *Der Einfluss von Wertewandel auf die intimen Lebensformen in der postmodernen Gesellschaft* (Hamburg, 2010), 11.

passionately debated as early as 1968.²⁹ With German reunification, these debates about changing values intensified.³⁰

Consequently, the call for values today is always a reaction of uncertainty and questioning of what our values are, where and how they collide with the values of “others,” which values we must insist on in order not to lose ourselves, and which values of others are actually non-values.³¹

Based on the Sinus-Milieus research from 2007, Mark Terkessidis concludes that ethnicity and religion are less relevant as value-forming factors than is assumed, which is why the assumption that migration growth jeopardises consensual values is false and, therefore, offers no basis for discourse on value change in connection with immigration.³² The pluralism of values is expressed in individual lifestyles and moral concepts.³³

In the context of a good communal life, I believe it should first be noted that the *Grundgesetz* does justice to a plurality of values as long as citizens’ subjective values do not come up against the limits of the liberal democratic constitutional state.³⁴ Many questions then arise: Are values in the sense of desirable basic attitudes sufficient to find one’s way in an increasingly complicated world? Would a close alignment of values improve interpersonal interactions? Can social consensus on values be the prerequisite for a good life? In the current educational discourse, there is hardly any talk of ethical competence, but there is increasing talk of values education.³⁵ These

29 Cf. Terkessidis, “Harte Verhandlungen,” 110; cf. Joachim Schmidt-Tiedemann, “Wertekompetenz als Ziel der Ingenieurausbildung,” in *Technik im Wertekonflikt*, ed. Heinz Duddeck (Wiesbaden, 2001), 238.

30 Cf. Heiner Meulemann, “Kulturumbbruch und Wiedervereinigung. Wertewandel in Deutschland in den letzten 60 Jahren,” in *Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen im Spiegel der empirischen Sozialforschung*, eds. Frank Faulbaum and Christof Wolf (Wiesbaden, 2010), 60 ff.

31 Regina Ammicht Quinn, “‘Gut’ sein: Theorie und Praxis von Wertediskursen,” in *Werte schulischer Begabtenförderung. Begabungsbegriff und Werteorientierung*, eds. Armin Hackl, Olaf Steenbuck, and Gabriele Weigand (Frankfurt, 2011), 12.

32 Terkessidis, “Harte Verhandlungen,” 117.

33 Terkessidis, “Harte Verhandlungen,” 116.

34 Terkessidis, “Harte Verhandlungen,” 122.

35 On educational discourses, see Rolf Wernstedt and Marei John-Ohnesorg, *Der Bildungsbegriff im Wandel. Verführung zum Lernen statt Zwang zum Büffeln, FES-Dokumentation einer Konferenz des Netzwerks Bildung vom 5.–6. Juli 2007* (Berlin, 2008), 9. Value education and ethical education have similar concerns

questions touch on both the debate about a dominant culture and the field of education. They will be discussed in more detail later against the background of the research questions.

In educational theories, it has often been debated whether the fundamental goal of formation is a successful life for people or whether it is rather about socialising people efficiently, i.e., making them socially acceptable, so that they can cope with the demands of a changing world and society.³⁶ Unclear social situations, coexistence, and encounters between cultures and religions, new technologies, digitalisation, and new political challenges demand moral judgements and decisions in daily social interaction. A broad-based school education that is not reduced to factual knowledge is therefore of central importance in preparing children and young people for their future (professional) lives.³⁷ It is increasingly important to acquire higher-level skills, abilities, and competencies for understanding the world and coping with life, especially in a time when knowledge is more freely available than ever before.³⁸ “We therefore

and initiate a related practice, but they are nevertheless not congruent. Cf. Quinn, “‘Gut’ sein,” 15.

Rudolf Englert calls for a distinction to be made between different components of ethical learning, which is why he argues in favour of a differentiated concept of competence in the context of ethical learning. He distinguishes between an aretaic component, which involves the development of dispositions to act in the sense of virtues, an evaluative component, which involves the assessment of material and immaterial goods, and finally a normative component, which involves the justification of ethical judgements. Rudolf Englert, “Religion, Werte, Bildung ..., bla, bla, bla. Die Integrationsdebatte als Tauglichkeitstest für ‘Schwatzbegriffe,’” in *Welche Werte braucht die Welt? Wertebildung in christlicher und muslimischer Perspektive*, eds. Mirjam Schambeck and Sabine Pemsel-Maier (Freiburg, 2017), 80–83.

- 36 Cf. Elisabeth Zwick, “Bildung und Ethik. Präliminarien zu einer grundlegenden Thematik aus historisch-systematischer Sicht,” in *Bildung und Ethik. Beiträge und Perspektiven jenseits disziplinärer Grenzen*, ed. Markus Fath (Berlin, 2013), 15.
- 37 In this context, a comprehensive critique of educational content by David Richard Precht is recommended: *Anna, die Schule und der liebe Gott: Der Verrat des Bildungssystems an unseren Kindern* (Munich, 2013).
- 38 Cf. interview with Dieter Frey and Martin Fladerer, “Werteerziehung und Persönlichkeitsentwicklung gehören neben der Wissensvermittlung auch auf den Lehrplan”, in *Werte – und was sie uns wert sind*, eds. Rodenstock and Sevsay-Tegethoff, 166.

need a good balance between knowledge transfer and personal development in our school system.”³⁹

For many years, the “tolerance of ambiguity” has become one of the central educational concerns in our ambiguous world, not only politically but also in general.⁴⁰ Inconsistencies, uncertainties and ambiguities are becoming more visible and challenge people’s ability to deal with ambiguity, ideally without devaluing ambiguity.⁴¹ In social encounters, people develop behavioural patterns, habitualised perceptual and decision-making dispositions, and basic temperaments that guide and structure their future actions.⁴² With regard to Islam, it was the Islamic scholar Thomas Bauer in particular who, in his theory of cultural ambiguity, recalled the rich culture of the Islamic tradition in the face of the increasing reduction of multiple references and ambiguities. Bauer defines the concept of ambiguity as follows:

A phenomenon of cultural ambiguity exists when, over a longer period of time, two opposing or at least two competing, clearly divergent meanings are simultaneously assigned to a term, a behaviour or an object, when a social group simultaneously draws norms and meanings for individual areas of life from opposing or strongly divergent discourses, or when different interpretations of a phenomenon are simultaneously accepted within a group, whereby none of these interpretations can claim exclusive validity.⁴³

Bauer understands tolerance of ambiguity as an open-mindedness towards constant cultural diversity. I believe that remembering this cultural ambiguity is currently a crucial source and resource for offering a broad spectrum of creativity in thought and action. For,

39 Cf. Frey and Fladerer, “Werteerziehung und Persönlichkeitsentwicklung”, 167.

40 Thomas Bauer, *Die Vereindeutigung der Welt. Über den Verlust an Mehrdeutigkeit und Vielfalt* (Stuttgart, 2018), 12. Cf. Dengel and Kelch, “Es ist kompliziert. Dazu guter Pop,” 55.

41 Cf. Naika Foroutan, “Die postmigrantische Perspektive: Aushandlungsprozesse in pluralen Gesellschaften”, in *Postmigrantische Visionen*, eds. Marc Hill and Erol Yildiz (Bielefeldt, 2018), 20.

42 Cf. Kathrin Audehm, “Habitus,” in *Handbuch Schweigendes Wissen. Erziehung, Bildung, Sozialisation und Lernen*, eds. Christoph Wulf et al. (Weinheim, 2017), 168.

43 Thomas Bauer, *Kultur der Ambiguität. Eine andere Geschichte des Islam* (Berlin, 2011), 27.

as Bauer rightly states, ambiguity in the Islamic world has gradually disappeared as the price of rapprochement with the West in the nineteenth century. It was precisely this “ambiguity that also led to fanaticism, in that the ideas generated by political or religious Muslim innovators were instrumentalised and declared to be the only valid truth.”⁴⁴ Not only in Europe but worldwide, Muslims oscillate between this old pole of tolerance of ambiguity and the new pole of ultra-orthodox unambiguity.⁴⁵ Increased experiences of marginalisation generally encourage people of faith to retreat to a conservative understanding and interpretation of religion.⁴⁶ The knowledge and awareness of diverse interpretations, the plurality of discourses and forms of practice can be used today as a functional argument against one-sided interpretative sovereignty, precisely because this tolerant attitude towards ambiguity is a genuinely Islamic trait.⁴⁷ This makes it all the more urgent for me to make this ambiguous culture of thought and life fruitful for contemporary discourses. Not only religious narrative traditions but also philosophical considerations and mystical forms of practice in the Islamic tradition offer good orientations for getting to know the conditions and dimensions of learning the ability to make judgements. In a reality whose degree of complexity is constantly growing, the question of what children and young people have at their disposal to be able to react ethically to the challenges of the future, and whether and how they can acquire

44 Yasemin Gökpinar, “Wein, Weib und Gesang – Ein etwas anderes Bild des Islams,” *JUSUR, Zeitschrift für Orientalistik, Islamwissenschaft und Arabistik* 3 (2020): 26.

45 On the problematisation of the loss of ambiguity for Islamic religious education, see Tuba Isik and Naciye Kamcili-Yildiz, “‘Ist Schweinegelatine halal oder haram?’ – Islamische Religionslehrkräfte zwischen Vereindeutigung und Ambiguitätstoleranz,” in *“Hauptsache, du hast eine Meinung und einen eigenen Glauben”: Positionalität (nicht nur) in der Kinder- und Jugendtheologie*. Jahrbuch für Kinder- und Jugendtheologie, vol. 5 eds. Mirjam Zimmermann, et al. (Stuttgart, 2022), 109–118.

46 Cf. Heinz Ulrich Brinkmann, “Erfolge und Probleme der Integration. Soziodemografische Hintergründe und Lebenslagen der Migrationsbevölkerung,” in *Dabeisein und Dazugehören. Integration in Deutschland*, eds. Heinz Ulrich Brinkmann and Hacı Halil Uslucan (Wiesbaden, 2013), 121ff.

47 Cf. Gökpinar, “Wein, Weib und Gesang,” 26.

this in the school context, becomes all the more important.⁴⁸ Not only are lifeworlds and realities becoming more complex, but so also are the ethical issues with which Muslim children and young people, as well as Muslim adults, are currently confronted. Above all, this requires the ability to reason and understand why a behaviour or an ethically justified rule should be valid. This can be based on one's own religious tradition, but when communicating with other perspectives, one must endeavour to express oneself in a way that is understandable to others and capable of reaching a consensus. This addresses people in their moral constitution, their self and their faith. The Islamic tradition can provide genuine orientation and impetus for this context of questions, as it offers a range of different forms of practice and orientation for working on character with a view to one's own lifestyle. *How do I want to live? How do I want to be? How can I be a good person? What does a prosperous, peaceful life entail?* In the face of decision-making situations, which character traits and attitudes can help us perceive otherness as a manifestation of the diverse possibilities of being human, to tolerate pluralistic life plans, not to negate difference and plurality, and not to allow them to become an exclusionary standard of judgement for encounters?

In earlier Islamic environments, the cultivation of ambiguity competency generally took place in a culturally and religiously comparatively homogeneous society. However, the Islamic tradition has a great deal to offer here. Although the current forms of plurality are many times more complex, the Islamic tradition nevertheless offers insights and examples that can be groundbreaking not only for Muslims in Germany today (and certainly beyond) but for everyone.

In order to practise community-building qualities, I believe it is first necessary to cultivate the personal qualities of the individual. The decisive focus in this book is therefore on the moral constitution of the individual. Under the conditions of increasingly perceptible

48 Cf. Hans Julius Schneider, "Einleitung: Ethisches Argumentieren," in *Ethik. Ein Grundkurs*, eds. Hastedt von Heiner and Ekkehard Martens (Reinbek, 1994), 33ff. Ingrid Schoberth, "In zweifelhaften Fällen entscheide man sich für das Richtige," in *Urteilen lernen – Grundlegung und Kontexte ethischer Urteilsbildung*, ed. Ingrid Schoberth (Göttingen, 2012), 11. With regard to Islamic religious education, this is an important interface between religious education and ethics that needs to be considered and addressed in an exchange between theological ethics, practical theology, and religious education.

difference, but also an increasingly complex world, the cultivation of basic moral attitudes seems to me to be more relevant than ever. In the following, I will take a closer look at some approaches that focus on the development of disposition and personal qualities and analyse their effectiveness.

2. Work on the Self with Ethical Virtues: A Component of the Educational Mission of Schools

In his book *Philosophie einer humanen Bildung*, the philosopher Julian Nida-Rümelin posed the question of what *formation* is and what role personality plays in it, among other things, in the context of the need to reestablish the connection between philosophy and educational practice.⁴⁹ He criticises the modern trend of reform efforts, which have neither an anthropological nor a philosophical foundation and therefore “do not reveal any idea of a humane development of personality.”⁵⁰ He points out that formation is inconceivable without the concept of personality.⁵¹ Following Nida-Rümelin, the questions *Who are we?* and *What makes us human?* emphasise the importance and continuous development of practical educational content and its didactics in the school context, which can contribute to a culture of self-reflection. “The regular, self-evident change of perspective can continuously reflect one’s own approach and educational content in everyday life.”⁵² At this point, it is worth briefly recalling this objective, which harks back to Humboldt, as well as the justified criticism of an education geared towards performance standards, in order to emphasise the implicit significance of the virtue ethics discourse for educational theory.

A document from the Ministry of Schools and Further Education of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia states the following with reference to the educational mission:

49 Julian Nida-Rümelin, *Philosophie einer humanen Bildung* (Hamburg, 2013), 8.

50 Nida-Rümelin, *Philosophie einer humanen Bildung*, 12.

51 Nida-Rümelin, *Philosophie einer humanen Bildung*, 21ff.

52 Michael Kroll, *Achtsam Lernen – Psychische Gesundheit systemisch bilden* (Berlin, 2018), 112.

The societal demands on school education and teaching range from expectations regarding students' subject-related competencies, which schools play a major role in developing, to long-term effects in the area of personality development, to which schools and teaching, as well as other areas of children's and young people's lives and experiences outside of school influence, make a decisive contribution.⁵³

The Ministry substantiates the fulfilment of its educational mandate by ensuring that learning processes are systematically geared towards comprehensive personal development.⁵⁴ This is made clear in detail in the North Rhine-Westphalia School Act, §2, Paragraph 2. It states:

Reverence for God, respect for human dignity, and a willingness to act socially are the primary goals of education. Young people should be educated in the spirit of humanity, democracy, and freedom, in tolerance and respect for the convictions of others, in responsibility for animals and the preservation of natural resources, in love for people and homeland, for the international community, and a spirit of peace.

The education and school mandate of Bavaria is very similar. Article 1 states:

(1) Schools shall fulfil the educational mission enshrined in the Constitution. (2) They shall impart knowledge and skills, and educate mind and body, heart and character. (3) The primary educational goals are reverence for God, respect for religious conviction, for human dignity and for the equal rights of men and women, self-control, a sense of responsibility and a willingness to take responsibility, a willingness to help, an open-mindedness for all that is true, good, and beautiful and a sense of responsibility for nature and the environment. (4) Students are to be educated in the spirit of democracy, in love for their Bavarian homeland and the German people, and in the spirit of international reconciliation.

The idea of personal development is similarly echoed in §2 of the Lower Saxony education and school mandate:

(1) Following preschool education, the school shall further develop the personalities of its students on the basis of Christianity, European

53 "Referenzrahmen Schulqualität NRW: Schule in NRW Nr. 9051," Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (2015), 11; www.schulentwicklung.nrw.de/referenzrahmen.

54 "Referenzrahmen Schulqualität NRW: Schule in NRW Nr. 9051," 19.

humanism, and the ideas of the liberal, democratic, and social freedom movements. (2) Education and teaching must comply with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Constitution of Lower Saxony; schools must convey the values on which these constitutions are based. (3) Students should become capable of making fundamental rights effective for themselves and everyone else, of understanding the resulting civic responsibility and of contributing to the democratic shaping of society, of acting in accordance with ethical principles and of recognising and respecting religious and cultural values.

The school and educational mandates of other federal states demonstrate a similar thrust, labelling the training and development of fundamental characteristics for personality development as the linchpin of formation and education.⁵⁵ All in all, in the context of the research presented here, it should be noted that, in their education and school mandates, the federal states are committed to personality development, character development, and/or the ability to act socially. This is not really surprising, as the German concept of formation is based on the Humboldtian tradition of self-activity and reciprocity with the world.⁵⁶ Formation should act as a stimulus for all human powers, so that the individual enters into a reciprocal relationship with the world as a whole and develops human powers as far as possible.⁵⁷ Consequently, education means reflectively engaging with the world, with its demands, constraints, and impositions, primarily scrutinising it and adopting a reflective, critical attitude. Only then can people achieve maturity and freedom, which is an important goal of formation. It also means taking social circumstances seriously and being concerned by unjust structures, grievances, and tensions, which (ideally) motivate people to be creatively committed to just causes, and to improve social conditions.⁵⁸ Accordingly, *self-*

55 Cf., e.g., SchulG Rheinland-Pfalz (§1), SächsSchulG for the Free State of Saxony (§1), educational mandate of Hamburg schools in HmbSG (1), SchulG Berlin (§3) educational objective.

56 Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Schriften zur Anthropologie und Geschichte: Theorie der Bildung des Menschen*, eds. Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, vol. 1 (Stuttgart/Darmstadt, 1980), 238.

57 Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Rechenschaftsbericht an den König*, eds. Andreas Flitner and Klaus Giel, vol. IV (Stuttgart/Darmstadt, 1980), 218.

58 At this point, it is worth remembering that the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) studies primarily show a connection between education, science, and justice on a quantitative and political level. Poor education has

awareness in and *with* society promotes and manifests itself in the processes of personality development, which is continuously dynamic. This means that personality is changeable. If the human being can therefore be understood as a “procedural form,” formation or education means not only engaging with the world but also *becoming* and *shaping oneself*.⁵⁹ On the one hand, this process of confrontation gives the individual access to themselves and, on the other hand, it creates the awareness of being able to mould and shape oneself.

In this context, the term *character* refers to the way a person's personality is characterised by stable, acquired, and changeable traits that can be recognised or read in a person's active *being* and actions. Every person is unique; even if different people have the same characteristics, they can exhibit individual differences in their thoughts, feelings, and behaviour.⁶⁰ A person's character, therefore, also implies a quality that can be perceived by the senses. The individual manifestations of these traits, habits, and inclinations or their manifestations in experiences and behaviours, distinguish people; thus, they define the person-specific character. The development of personality appears to be equivalent to the development of a moral self-disclosure. This moral character is like a stamp on a person that defines their particular nature and can be used to determine whether a person has a “good” or “bad” character. Against this background, it becomes clear that the meanings of personality and character overlap.

In my understanding, the concept of the self-forms a reflexive understanding of character or personality on the one hand. On the other hand, it denotes the correspondence between mental life and character and refers to the essence of personal being. As previously explained, ethical action is not only of a reflexive nature but is also always worldview-based and internalised through socialisation. In

a negative impact on society and its prosperity. Cf. Rainhard Z. Bengez, “Bildung und Wissenschaft,” in *Bildung und Ethik*, ed. Fath (Berlin, 2013), 66.

59 For the expression “procedural form” (*prozedurales Formgebilde*), see Monika Witsch, “Das Subjekt als Korrelation von Individuation und Vergesellschaftung oder warum man auch bildungstheoretisch nicht auf einem Bein stehen kann,” (peDocs, 2011; DOI: 10.25656/01:3331), 7.

60 See Jule Specht and Denis Gerstorf, “Persönlichkeitsentwicklung und Coaching,” in *Handbuch Schlüsselkonzepte im Coaching*, eds. Siegfried Greif et al. (Wiesbaden, 2018), 442.

many cases, the reflexive moment only becomes explicitly effective after the action. The interweaving of ideological convictions, prerequisites related to socialisation (and development), and the ability to reflect ultimately represents the great challenge of ethical learning.

Understanding and reflecting on one's own self and the individual reasons for one's actions have been considered not only in philosophy but also in Islamic theological contexts. Kant famously asked the very specific question, "What should I do?," and explained how this question is closely linked to the question of what a person is. Ethical questions always require anthropological reflection. The individual, anthropological idea of one's own destiny is, in turn, essentially characterised by worldview and ideological convictions. The Qur'an offers some answers to these questions, which can be stimulating for educational thinking about personal development and ethical learning. This will be explored in chapter three.

If self-determination philosophically and theologically requires an awareness of who someone is, part of this question is also achieved in the anticipation of the external perception of others in order to prevent any self-deception or distorted self-perception as far as possible. The first step, however, is to take stock of one's own self. Self-acceptance, i.e., accepting the status quo of oneself, is crucial for the next step of reflecting on this self and working on it.

However, it is important to reflect on habits, behavioural patterns, inclinations, abilities, weaknesses, and personal characteristics. Self-reflection is the constitutive basis for a person's development as well as for intersubjectivity, i.e., the prerequisite and possibility of a cognitive and emotional change of perspective; because without understanding oneself, it will hardly be possible to empathise with others. Only self-knowledge can enable the ability to relate.⁶¹ Being able to make judgements about oneself demonstrates a reflective relationship to the self and the world. In concrete dealings with others, oneself, and the world around us, self- and world-skills are acquired

61 In the context of children of primary school age and in inclusive learning settings, it is imperative to consider individual differences. Even young people with cognitive support needs are capable of human relationships; however, their ability to reflect on their relationship with themselves may be contingent on their support needs or cognitive impairment.

in connection with one's own person.⁶² My intensive recourse to Humboldt is due to the conviction that Humboldt's understanding of education comes closest to humanistic personal development.⁶³ This educational theory should be further developed and expanded in view of a changed (and changing) pluralistic society.⁶⁴ Based on school and educational mandates, the broad consensus on personality development was apparent. Pedagogical endeavours to achieve personality development have already been addressed. However, attention should be focused on the fact that this needs to be discussed in pluralistic societies, because what constitutes *personality* in a positive sense will have different emphases depending on whether one is religious or non-religious.

Education describes the ability to become aware of oneself and to recognise oneself. I understand this to mean self-revision, introspection, contemplation, and spiritual examination of the self, as well as reflective, active, ethical action in the respective lifeworld. With Wittgenstein, it could be said that *working on one's self*, on one's own understanding and perception of things, is an essential part of educational work.⁶⁵ Following Humboldt, it can therefore be said that working on one's character is part of the educational ideal and the educational understanding of the self-thinking person, who not only strives to educate themselves cognitively but also keeps his or her (moral) character in mind. What is meant by this is a shaping of the interiority, which finds its expression in the outer, i.e., in actions. This is based on the idea that a revision and refinement of character has a positive influence on the creative forces that emerge in social interaction. Similarly, Nida-Rümelin understands education as a process of human development.

62 Cf. Frauke Kurbacher, *Zwischen Personen. Eine Philosophie der Haltung* (Würzburg, 2017), *passim*.

63 Cf. Stefan Pohlmann, Gabriele Vierzigmann, and Sven Winterhalder, "Einführung," in *Weiter denken durch wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung*, eds. Stefan Pohlmann, Gabriele Vierzigmann, and Thomas Doyé (Wiesbaden, 2017), 34.

64 Cf. Julian Nida-Rümelin and Klaus Zierer, *Bildung in Deutschland vor neuen Herausforderungen* (Baltmannsweiler, 2017), *passim*.

65 "Working on philosophy—as is often the case in architecture—is actually more about working on oneself. On one's own perception. On how you see things. (And what one demands of them.)," Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Vermischte Bemerkungen. Eine Auswahl aus dem Nachlass*, eds. Alois Pichler and Georg Henrik von Wright (Frankfurt, 1994), 52.

According to humanistic understanding, the respective educational idea represents the normative content of our self-understanding as human beings. Since people must always be seen as an end in themselves and must never be used (instrumentalised) exclusively for other (external) purposes, the normative core of a humanistic anthropology is thus transferred to the humanistic concept of education. If education is nothing other than the guided and, as far as possible, self-determined development of the human being, the development of human personality traits (virtues), and the practice of a genuinely human way of life, then education in this sense is an end in itself. It is the coupling of anthropology and educational theory in humanistic thinking that excludes instrumentalist views.⁶⁶

Accordingly, a *culture of togetherness, respect, and esteem* requires the development of people's inherent personal qualities in order to be able to engage in improving interactions. With this claim, we are moving into the scientific field of education and the creation of a specific understanding of education. According to Horkheimer, education must not be limited to the individual development of the personality but must also relate to social cohesion.⁶⁷ What is needed is a level of education that takes the plural context seriously, affirms the mutual recognition of otherness and sets this as an educational goal.⁶⁸ After all, the development that education has to do with is the development of a dignified existence and respect for others despite differing views. Consequently, educational processes should address and thematise social reality and provoke sociocritical thought in order to challenge the status quo for the better. However, schools also need to be redefined in terms of educational theory and social policy in order to counteract social polarisation tendencies, promote democratic awareness and social-ethical skills, and declare respectful interaction to be constitutive for social cohesion.⁶⁹

66 Cf. Nida-Rümelin, *Philosophie einer humanen Bildung*, 52.

67 See Max Horkheimer, "Begriff der Bildung," in Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8 (Frankfurt, 1985), 409–419.

68 See Peter Graf, "Religiöse Bildung als individuelle Entfaltung der Person," in *Religiöse Bildung im Dialog zwischen Christen und Muslimen* eds. Peter Graf and Bülent Uçar (Stuttgart, 2011), 64.

69 The idea of a democratic civil society invites people to identify with the democratic principles of the community and to get involved in its interests. The idea of civil society places the individual at the centre of all social action as its origin, actor and goal. As social beings, they should not only enjoy their freedom as

A visionary and forward-looking educational theory that aims to prepare children and young people for a constantly changing and culturally diverse world should focus on character. In understanding one's own life as a process of personal improvement, one must ask about the conditions for the cultivation of morally desirable dispositions that are compatible with one's own ideological foundations, e.g., the beliefs, rules, and rites of a particular religion on the one hand, with the socially relevant foundations of a pluralistic society on the other hand, thus serving one's own identity formation and a prosperous coexistence in the sense of a good life for all. Accordingly, emphasising the ethical virtue orientation of education within the framework of school education (in accordance with educational and school mandates) is the central idea of my research. However, this would be misunderstood if it were a matter of declaring that virtues as character traits should be learning objectives. A pedagogy that deliberately tries to change a person's character would violate the autonomy of the individual.⁷⁰ Furthermore, it is not a virtue ethics approach if it were to provide fixed information about ethically correct behaviour, i.e., if the context-dependent realisation of a virtue, which must be justified anew in each case, were to be defined normatively. Rather, it is about the quality of character and the question of how a person should be in order to live a good life and which virtues are necessary or helpful for a good life for everyone in a pluralistic society.

In encounters with other people and in new situations, people are always challenged in their self-relationship and their relationship to the world around them. As a further consequence, character also

private individuals but also understand it as a responsibility to participate in public affairs. It presupposes an active relationship between the individual and the society in which he lives and which he understands as his own. In order for every citizen to be able to internalise this idea, appropriate political structures and institutions are needed that do justice to diversity in society and do not exclude or humiliate anyone, *per se*. Diversity refers not only to "migration background," but also to gender, sexual orientation, class, age, or disability. Such a society will characterise and determine the spirit of society and cooperation. For more, see Avishai Margalit, *Decent Society* (Harvard, 1997). See also the current school laws of the federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria, among others.

70 Carsten Roeger, *Philosophieunterricht zwischen Kompetenzorientierung und philosophischer Bildung* (Berlin/Toronto, 2016), 157.

reveals the attitudes that co-determine behaviour. The self and the cultivation of its character traits thus form the centrepiece of the understanding of education advocated here. Only through the help of the educational processes can an awareness be created of what is and what should be. Accordingly, we must ask about desirable personal characteristics. As can be seen from the above, the concept of virtue offers potential for this. Based on Aristotle and taking into account other virtue ethicists, it is important to define this concept and to formulate a definition that can be operationalised for the educational discourse.

3. Consideration of Existing Concepts for Personality Development

When it comes to the conditions that make it possible to live well together, to co-exist in a way that creates a desirable shared quality of life, then we need children and young people who are willing to work not only for their own good but also for the good of others. Basically, what is needed is a twofold understanding of freedom that sees the realisation of one's own freedom, i.e., one's own well-being, precisely in the recognition of others' freedom. Children and young people need to develop independent judgement to the extent that they are able to free themselves from the influence of external judgements and, at the same time, develop the ability to engage with with those judgements in a reasoned manner. However, the adoption of certain basic personal attitudes plays a constitutive role in this, and the *locus classicus* for a discussion of basic attitudes can be found in philosophical discourses, more specifically in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*—as will be explained later. The concept of virtue refers to the question of which personal attitudes a person acts from. There are various existing approaches that reflect on the moral constitution of human beings and their conditions. At this point, it is important to examine the most widely received approaches.

3.1 Approaches to Values Education

The aforementioned processes of secularisation and change that our society has undergone in the last century go hand in hand with the question of how children can be supported as they grow into society. On a political, social, and theoretical level, discussions are constantly taking place about which fundamental values are important for the direction and organisation of personal life and living together.⁷¹ In academic literature, many models and approaches have been developed to date with regard to values education and the teaching of values in the school context, which explicitly emphasise the value-forming relevance of school lessons. This applies both to the subject of religious education and to other subjects such as philosophy, ethics, *Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde* (Life Design-Ethics-Teaching about Religions), and the like. Even though these models are fundamentally concerned with reflection, cognition, and the ability to criticise values, they differ considerably from one another. While models of values education include the promotion of decision-making skills, the clarification of values, and the ability to make moral judgements, the teaching of values is concerned with the concrete communication and concrete practice of values.⁷² The decisive moment at this point is not to functionalise and sublimate the focus on socially desirable values through values education, but to ask the concrete question of which values are part of our self-image as people who want to treat each other humanely, socially, and peacefully.⁷³ It is a different discussion as to which approaches these named values should be applied in the school context. In principle, it is necessary to discuss what corresponds to the objective: ethical and/or moral formation, ethical education, value education, or value formation? It is clear at this point that it must first be clarified what is meant by a value and what is meant by a virtue, and how they are defined in this book.

71 Cf. Dagmar Fenner, *Das gute Leben* (Berlin/New York, 2007), 153.

72 For the school context, a combination of the various approaches discussed currently appears to be the most promising method of moral education. Cf. Lutz Mauermann, "Pädagogische Explikation," in *Handbuch der Erziehungswissenschaft* vol. I, eds. Lutz Koch et al. (Leiden, 2019), 661.

73 See Elisabeth Naurath, "Bildung, Werte,," *WiReLex*, <http://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/stichwort/100191/> (February 2016).

Under the conditions of an increasingly plural society, values are increasingly being questioned and affirmed in terms of their social relevance and significance for coexistence (and integration).⁷⁴ The debate is still current, even a good thirty-five years after Brezinka's remarks.⁷⁵ In view of the amount of literature on value theory and the public debates on *Leitkultur* (dominant culture) in connection with values, in which the term seems to have become a political buzzword, it is clear how much ambiguity there actually is in this field.⁷⁶ At the political level in particular, there is a consensus on the need for an education in values, as it is hoped that this will create a sense of community. According to Böckenförde's dictum, a democratic society depends on value orientations that are constitutive for the success of a social structure, because the state is increasingly losing its ethical "formative power," and the state itself cannot evoke any binding forces with values.⁷⁷ Against this background, the question has been posed to religious communities as to how and what they can contribute to the common good and public spirit.⁷⁸ This question will be taken up again in the next chapter, when the potential of Islam to promote the common good and peace will be analysed using the example of Islamic philosophical ethical thinking.

74 See, for example, Zentrum für Globale Fragen an der Hochschule für Philosophie, *Gelingende Wertebildung im Kontext von Migration. Eine Handreichung für die Bildungspraxis* (Munich, 2017).

75 Cf. Mirjam Schambeck, "Was religiöse Wertebildung zur Integration beitragen kann. Überlegungen aus der Religionspädagogik," in *Welche Werte braucht die Welt?*, eds. Schambeck and Pemsler-Maier, 118–138.

76 See Stephan Ernst, "Pluralität und Verbindlichkeit sittlicher Werte," *Stimmen der Zeit*, 235 (2017): 518–530; cf. Wolfgang Brezinka, *Erziehung in einer wertunsicheren Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Praktischen Pädagogik* (Munich, 1993), 112.

77 The dictum is: "The liberal, secularized state lives by prerequisites which it cannot guarantee itself," Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, "Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation," in *Recht, Staat, Freiheit: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte* (Frankfurt, 1992), 92 (112). Cf. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, "Fundamente der Freiheit," in *Was hält die moderne Gesellschaft zusammen?*, ed. Erwin Teufel (Frankfurt, 1996), 91; Jochen Schmidt, "Was erwartet der Staat von der Religion? Ein Versuch über Tugend und Religion," in *Staat und Religion. Aspekte einer sensiblen Verhältnisbestimmung*, eds. Rüdiger Althaus and Jochen Schmidt (Freiburg, 2019), 8.

78 Cf. Hans Michael Heinig, *Die Verfassung der Religion. Beiträge zum Religionsverfassungsrecht* (Tübingen, 2014), 10.

The constitutional state creates laws for the peaceful and non-violent coexistence of the members of society, but it cannot create the sociomoral conditions for the members of society to live together cooperatively.⁷⁹ Habermas's interpretation of Böckenförde's dictum is that people depend on cooperation with one another, that this requires mutual stability of the citizens' joint expectations of responsibility and that therefore liberal societies are dependent on virtuous citizens.⁸⁰

That is why political virtues, even if they are only "raised" in small coins, are essential for the survival of a democracy. They are a matter of socialisation and acclimatisation to the practices and ways of thinking of a liberal political culture. Citizenship is, to a certain extent, embedded in a civil society that thrives on spontaneous, if you will, "pre-political" sources.⁸¹

Habermas thus associates the coexistence of free individuals in a democratic community with virtue, because virtues can establish stability.

This moves the connection between freedom and virtue from everyday practice into the sphere of political philosophy, fundamentally re-dimensioning the significance of individual attitudes and behaviour and reformulating it with a view to civic ethics.⁸²

79 Cf. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, "Entstehung und Wandel des Rechtsbegriffs," in *Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht* (Frankfurt, 1976), 65–92; cf. Michael Sandel, "Die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und das Gut der Gemeinschaft," in *Konstruktionen praktischer Vernunft. Philosophie im Gespräch*, ed. Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Frankfurt, 2000), 252.

80 Cf. Simone Kauffeld, *Kompetenzen messen, bewerten, entwickeln. Ein prozessanalytischer Ansatz für Gruppen* (Stuttgart, 2006), 16.

81 Jürgen Habermas, "Vorpolitische Grundlagen des demokratischen Rechts?," in *Dialektik der Säkularisierung. Über Vernunft und Religion*, eds. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger et al. (Freiburg/Vienna, 2011), 23. Political virtues include, for example, obedience to the law on a voluntary basis, willingness to cooperate, fairness, and tolerance. Democratic virtues include participation, responsibility, and argumentation. See Rudolf Speth and Ansgar Klein, "Demokratische Grundwerte in der pluralisierten Gesellschaft," in *Werte in der politischen Bildung, Didaktische Reihe der Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg*, eds. Gotthard Breit and Siegfried Schiele (Schwalbach, 2000), 35–55; Ansgar Klein, *Der Diskurs der Zivilgesellschaft. Politische Kontexte und demokratietheoretische Folgerungen* (Wiesbaden, 2001), 386.

82 Sutter, *Der Wille zur Gesellschaft*, 145.

Virtuous civic behaviour means, among other things, strengthening the desirable attitudes of subjects that are conducive to the common good.⁸³ According to Böckenförde, it is precisely because people can be so ambivalent in their behaviour that we need “points of support” for successful coexistence.⁸⁴ In line with the theorem, (civic) virtues can be understood as an ethical bonus that members of society can strive for if they want to contribute to a successful and happy lifestyle and achieve it themselves. However, a certain caution is warranted when it comes to expectations of political virtues. This is because they can be exploited by destructive ideologies, as evidenced by historical and political experiences.⁸⁵ Furthermore, they must not be enforced, as they would otherwise lead to the destruction of the freedom of members of society.⁸⁶ However, this present work is by no means concerned with political virtues but exclusively with virtues in the sense of personal qualities that dispose people to react to things in an excellent or at least sufficient manner—a paraphrase of Christine Swanton’s concept of virtue.⁸⁷

Two things can be inferred from the preceding remarks: firstly, that (democratic) societies need virtuous and value-oriented citizens, and secondly, that both values and virtues play an important role in the situational identification of solutions to problems. This requires a definition of values that is conducive to the reception of virtue. According to Hans Joas, values are strongly emotionally supported ideas about what is desirable, and they have the function of making action attractive.⁸⁸ An attachment to values does not take place intentionally, but the attachment is *perceived* as binding. Desired actions are evaluated by referring to a value to which a person

83 Cf. Schmidt, “Was erwartet der Staat von der Religion?,” 7.

84 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, *Kirche und christlicher Glaube in den Herausforderungen der Zeit. Beiträge zur politisch-theologischen Verfassungsgeschichte 1957–2002* (Münster, 2007), 590ff.

85 See Ernst Piper, “Preußische Tugenden im Zeitalter der totalitären Herausforderung,” *ZRGG* 53 (2001): 35–45.

86 See Herfried Münkler and Anna Loll, “Das Dilemma von Tugend und Freiheit. Die Notwendigkeit von Eigenverantwortung in einer funktionierenden Bürgergesellschaft,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Arbeitskreis Bürgergesellschaft und Aktivierender Staat, Bürgergesellschaft 17 (Bonn, 2005), 3.

87 Christine Swanton, *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* (New York, 2003), 19ff.; Schmidt, “Was erwartet der Staat von der Religion?,” 8.

88 Hans Joas, *Die Entstehung der Werte* (Frankfurt, 2006), 3, 5.

feels attached. For Joas, values represent the good, i.e., values are orienting ideas about what one considers fundamentally desirable and valuable.⁸⁹ Joas thus comes to the conclusion that values and value commitments arise “in the experience of self-education and self-transcendence.”⁹⁰ Thus values arise through self-awareness in the context of socialisation through family, community, and society, as people develop through feeling, reflection, and action. Values are ideas about which desire is perceived as personally coherent; it is a kind of reflexive weighing of what is desirable and good.⁹¹ However, considerations about a successful life not only call for the introduction of binding values in the sense of virtues, as otherwise no new value orientations could emerge, but virtues appear to be important as a complementary, independent variant of values.⁹² If values are subjective, desire-based judgements, it should be noted that desirability is not a sufficient criterion for determining valuable characteristics.⁹³ The pursuit of virtues in the sense of *aretē* (Greek: goodness), which brings a person into a good moral condition, can support reflective deliberation. Virtue ethics aims to form and cultivate desirable character traits. For the time being, virtues in the sense of desirable qualities can be understood as those personal characteristics that make people capable of reacting to events and situations in the best possible way.⁹⁴ The emphasis on situational awareness and assessment of circumstances, which are required for virtuous action, can be an enriching contribution of virtues to value formation. Since values are more fundamental than virtues, virtues can reveal a scope of action that is more concrete than the overarching value, but which is also more open than a social norm. Virtue ethics can therefore be helpful both to the individual in a pluralistic society and to the community, because it is easier to agree

89 Joas, *Die Entstehung der Werte*, 252ff.; Cf. *Gelingende Wertebildung im Kontext von Migration*, 10.

90 Joas, *Die Entstehung der Werte*, 10.

91 Cf. Nadja Schwendemann, *Werthaltungen von Lehrkräften in der Erwachsenenbildung: Eine rekonstruktive Studie* (Wiesbaden, 2018), 45ff.

92 Cf. Karl-Heinz Hillmann, *Wertwandel* (Würzburg, 2008), 407ff.

93 Cf. Martin Hähnel, *Das Ethos der Ethik. Zur Anthropologie der Tugend* (Wiesbaden, 2015), 110.

94 Cf. Schmidt, “Was erwartet der Staat von der Religion?,” 145.

on possible courses of action, even if the worldview or ideology is very different.

Over the course of their life, a person can achieve a fixed disposition or basic disposition by making revised value-based decisions. To do this, they must have established, tested, reproduced, and consolidated these value convictions in different situations so that they become ingrained with recourse to these practical experiences, i.e., they characterise people to such an extent that they become character traits and thus develop into dispositions.⁹⁵ According to my working definition, these dispositional attitudes are virtues. This is, therefore, an important interface between values and virtues. *Virtuous values* can therefore be understood as aiming at a complex and practical capacity for judgement that enables people to suitably assess a situation, recognise facts, judge an individual case correctly, and make (morally) appropriate decisions.

The reflexive acceptance of and sensitisation to values is consequently important in the school context. Most approaches to values education aim to raise awareness of one's own values, which encourages self-reflection and helps develop judgement and decision-making skills through the argumentation of one's own values.⁹⁶

The educationalist Wolfgang Brezinka considers the idea of teaching *values* alone to be too "timid," as it does not lead to stable value convictions.⁹⁷ In addition, *teaching* values in a pluralistic society and in moral philosophy seems very problematic and is viewed critically. Like Brezinka, other educationalists seem to share the position that education in virtues is a particularly promising form of values education. Hackl, for example, claims that values education at school "tends to focus more on virtues derived from values (e.g. fairness in grading or non-violence in the school environment) and, above all, on the practice of verifiable secondary virtues (punctuality, order, perseverance, etc.)."⁹⁸

95 See Georg Lohmann, "Werte, Tugenden und Urteilsbildung. Gegenstände und Ziele von Ethikunterricht und Politikunterricht," in *Werte in der politischen Bildung*, eds. Breit and Schiele, 208.

96 Cf. Roland W. Henke, "Die Demokratie und der Streit um Werte," *Wertediskurse im Unterricht*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 4.

97 Cf. Brezinka, *Erziehung in einer wertunsicheren Gesellschaft*, 132.

98 Armin Hackl, "Konzepte schulischer Werteerziehung," in *Werte schulischer Begabtenförderung*, eds. Hackl, Steenbeck, and Weigand (eds.), 19. At this point,

Under the conditions of diversity, a pedagogical interplay between the discourses on values and virtues appears to be promising. Accordingly, approaches to values education could be further developed in the direction of virtues and virtuous values. Moral education models from the field of ethical formation can open up new perspectives for this. With this first heuristic conclusion, it seems appropriate to talk about the usefulness of ethical formation.

3.2 Ethical Formation

In the literature and in practice, concepts of ethical formation and upbringing can be found in various subjects such as philosophy or religious education, which will not all be problematised here, but, by concentrating on the analysis, merely made fruitful for the context concerned.⁹⁹ What these conceptions all have in common is that they are based on the possibility and necessity of ethical formation for young people.¹⁰⁰ In view of a pluralistic society, which is inherently dynamic, ethical approaches are constantly faced with new challenges. Considering modern, pluralistic societies, *ethical formation*—which aims to enable the independent establishment of values, norms, rules, and/or virtues—is a realistic objective that could be achieved in various school subjects. The concept of *ethical education* seems less useful for the present research horizon, which envisages the practising of (ethical) rules and norms. Such a concept of Islamic philosophical provenance, which would carry in a normativity with it in a theological context, would no longer be translatable for non-Muslims and would, therefore, no longer be accessible for others. For this reason, approaches that aim to develop basic moral attitudes

however, I am hardly concerned with extolling secondary virtues that need to be revitalised in the context of values education.

99 For approaches such as prosociality, compassion, or model learning, see Matthias Bahr, *Erziehung zur Prosozialität bei Acht- bis Zehnjährigen am Lernort Religionsunterricht* (St. Ottilien, 1992); Lothar Kuld and Stefan Gönneheimer, *Compassion – Sozialverpflichtetes Lernen und Handeln* (Stuttgart, 2000); Hans Mendl, *Modelle – Vorbilder – Leitfiguren. Lernen an außergewöhnlichen Biografien* (Stuttgart, 2015).

100 Cf. Reinhold Mokrosch, “Art. Ethische Bildung und Erziehung,” *Wissenschaftlich Religionspädagogisches Lexikon im Internet* (2016): 11, www.wirelex.de.

come closest to the concern here. My aim is not to discuss what is ethically right or wrong from an Islamic philosophical perspective but rather to argue what contributions this religious tradition provides young people in their context and decision-making situations, so that they can develop and justify what is ethically desirable and act accordingly. After all, it is hardly possible to practise desirable virtues such as prudence or courage in school lessons. By contrast, dispositions can be acquired within a school context through practical projects that require theoretical reflection on values and virtues such as courage, justice, and respect. The *values clarification* model, which involves explaining values, norms, and in some cases, virtues, is also inadequate compared to a substantive discussion.¹⁰¹ The model presupposes a consensus among all participants regarding the virtues and values that are considered desirable. A pertinent criticism of this clarification model was that it examined values and/or virtues in a highly subjective and culturally context-free manner.¹⁰²

In addition, volitional and emotional skills are part of the substantive examination of values and virtues when it comes to overcoming, for example, reluctance or obstacles to action.¹⁰³ According to Kant, the acquisition of virtues also touches and affects the heart, which is honed to become a morally good person.¹⁰⁴ An overall concept that combines the reflection of values and the deliberation of virtues and virtuous behaviour, and that makes personal development processes the starting point for ethical learning, comes closest to the aim of this book.

101 See Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, *Werte und Ziele. Methoden zur Sinnfindung im Unterricht* (Munich, 1976).

102 Cf. Mokrosch, "Art. Ethische Bildung und Erziehung," 5.

103 Cf. Rudolf Englert, "Die verschiedenen Komponenten ethischen Lernens und ihr Zusammenspiel," in *Ethisches Lernen*, Jahrbuch der Religionspädagogik vol. 31, eds. Englert et al. (2015), 111.

104 Immanuel Kant, *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (RGV), in *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (AA), vol. VI, ed. Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1907), 47.

3.3 Recognition Pedagogy

For the social philosopher Axel Honneth, recognition is one of the fundamental elements of a society and is a constitutive prerequisite for the sociality of different social groups. Even though Honneth's theory of recognition can be found, for example, in political philosophy, there has been an increasing interest in the topic of recognition within educational theory discourse since the mid-1990s.¹⁰⁵ In particular, Annedore Prengel initiated a new discussion in German-speaking countries with her concept of an explicitly pedagogical theory of recognition—*the pedagogy of diversity*.¹⁰⁶ Krassimir Stojanov's sociophilosophical approach, which Honneth's approach develops further in terms of educational theory, is of interest for the context here, because it takes a closer look at the social framework conditions for educational processes.¹⁰⁷ According to Stojanov's thesis, educational equity presupposes forms of recognition such as empathy, respect, and social appreciation, which he defines as normative sources for successful coexistence in a society.¹⁰⁸ Stojanov believes that the processes of self-awareness and self-development are hindered by lived experiences of disrespect.¹⁰⁹ Precisely this realisation—that only experiences of recognition enable individuals to develop self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect—is a remarkable insight for educational discourse.¹¹⁰

105 Cf. Christiane Micus-Loos, "Anerkennung des Anderen als Herausforderung in Bildungsprozessen," *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik* 58, 3 (2012): 310.

106 For an overview, see Cathrin Reisenauer and Nadine Ulseß-Schurda, *Anerkennung in der Schule. Über Anlässe, Abläufe und Wirkweisen von Adressierungen* (Bern, 2018).

107 See Annedore Prengel, *Pädagogik der Vielfalt. Verschiedenheit und Gleichberechtigung in Interkultureller, Feministischer und Integrativer Pädagogik* (Wiesbaden, 2019); Krassimir Stojanov, *Bildung und Anerkennung. Soziale Voraussetzungen von Selbst-Entwicklung und Welt-Erschließung* (Wiesbaden, 2006); and Krassimir Stojanov, "Bildungsgerechtigkeit im Spannungsfeld zwischen Verteilungs-, Teilhabe- und Anerkennungsgerechtigkeit," in *Gerechtigkeit und Bildung*, eds. Michael Wimmer, Roland Reichenbach, and Ludwig A. Pongratz (Paderborn, 2007), 29–48.

108 See Stojanov, *Bildung und Anerkennung*.

109 Cf. Stojanov, *Bildung und Anerkennung*, 107.

110 Cf. Paul Mecheril et al., *Migrationspädagogik* (Weinheim, 2010); Nicole Balzer and Norbert Ricken, "Anerkennung als pädagogisches Problem. Markierungen

In a pedagogical reading of Honneth's theory of recognition, the question therefore arises as to whether it is sufficient for people to cultivate certain forms of recognition as basic attitudes in order to not avoid other people, and to meet them on equal terms and deal with ethical challenges. Following Hegel, Honneth distinguishes between three forms of recognition: appreciation or love (emotional respect), respect (legal respect), and solidarity or egalitarian difference (social respect). According to Honneth, functions of recognition and refusal of recognition or experiences of disregard result from a communicative-discursive practice.

At this first level of reciprocal recognition, the individual should learn to experience themselves as an individual, endowed with basic needs but is also dependent on others and their care, in an environment characterised by care, affection, and emotional bonds in order to be able to establish an intact relationship with themselves.¹¹¹

Honneth explains that the enabling conditions of ego identity are based on a dynamic that arises from both (discursive) experiences of disregard and recognition that we have as intersubjective beings. For Honneth, this dynamic is the basis for being able to understand what (mutual or discursive) love, respect, and solidarity mean or to develop a healthy self-respect, i.e., one that neither loses itself in egomania nor self-abandonment.

As Honneth, alongside Charles Taylor and others, aptly put it, people are drastically affected emotionally when they lose the respect of others.¹¹² Everyone needs recognition, and denied recognition is hurtful.¹¹³ Recognition is described as a basic anthropological

im erziehungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs," in *Anerkennung*, eds. Alfred Schäfer and Christiane Thompson (Paderborn, 2010), 35–87.

111 Axel Honneth, "Verwilderungen. Kampf um Anerkennung im frühen 21. Jahrhundert," *APuZ* 1–2 (2011): 38.

112 Honneth, "Verwilderungen," 37; See also Jürgen Straub, *Verstehen, Kritik, Anerkennung. Das Eigene und das Fremde in der Erkenntnisbildung interpretativer Wissenschaften* (Göttingen, 1999) and Tzvetan Todorov, *Abenteuer des Zusammenlebens. Versuch einer allgemeinen Anthropologie* (Berlin, 1996).

113 It can be emotionally painful for someone to have to *pretend to be* someone else in order to receive someone else's recognition and to be able to have a conversation with them at all.

need.¹¹⁴ “Non-recognition or misrecognition can cause suffering, can be a form of oppression, can trap the other person in a false, deformed existence.”¹¹⁵ Recognition in interpersonal relationships is therefore an important building block for identity formation.¹¹⁶

I agree with Honneth that intersubjective processes are required in order to form an intact identity as a subject. That there should be symmetry among the discourse partners in negotiation processes is an ideal. According to Honneth, there is a *struggle for recognition*. But a fair fight is ideally based on symmetrical preconditions. However, some struggles begin asymmetrically in favour of the majority society, which creates unequal ground for new efforts for recognition. There are many examples of this in Germany. For example, Muslims have had to fight for their religious equality in various legal matters—which Honneth describes as legal recognition and which must be distinguished from emotional recognition. However, a structural refusal of recognition can also lead to emotional injury. The structural refusal of recognition or, in other cases, hard-fought recognition or long-term efforts for recognition have led and continue to lead directly to labelling, stigmatisation, and humiliation of the petitioners in the public sphere, as Avishai Margalit also describes such a phenomenon.¹¹⁷ These experiences of denial of recognition have all too often reinforced negative attitudes, emotions, and behaviour in the majority society. This was made particularly clear by the Bertelsmann Foundation’s *Religion Monitor*.¹¹⁸ The study *Muslims in Europa: Integriert aber nicht akzeptiert?* (*Muslims in*

114 Cf. Charles Taylor, *Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung* (Frankfurt, 1993), 15; Axel Honneth, “Anerkennung und moralische Verpflichtung,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 51.4 (1997): 25–41; Todorov, *Abenteuer des Zusammenlebens*, passim.

115 Taylor, *Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung*, 13ff.

116 Cf. Stefan Altmeyer and Monika Tautz, “Der Religionsunterricht als Ort Komparativer Theologie? Auf dem Weg zu einer fundamentalen und konkreten Didaktik des interreligiösen Lernens,” in *Komparative Theologie. Herausforderung für die Religionspädagogik. Perspektiven zukunftsfähigen interreligiösen Lernens*, eds. Klaus von Stosch, Rita Burrichter, and Georg Langenhorst (Paderborn/Leiden, 2015), 117ff.

117 Cf. Margalit, *Decent Society*, 9–28.

118 See the Bertelsmann Foundation/Bertelsmann-Stiftung’s *Religion Monitor* studies “Zusammenleben in kultureller Vielfalt” (2018) and “Sonderauswertung Islam” (2017).

Europe: Integrated but not Accepted?) states that, in addition to the hurdles and resistance that Muslims have had to overcome as part of their integration efforts, there is also a lack of recognition of their religiosity.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, the majority society is called upon to “take its self-formulated claims to plurality seriously and... not measure its willingness to recognise them by how foreign or familiar a religious practice is to it.”¹²⁰ With Habermas and Honneth, we must therefore continue to constantly ask how the conditions for the possibility of symmetrical respect can be ensured—respect that the individual shows for the integrity of all other persons.¹²¹ For pedagogical theories of recognition, recognition is a key category in the relationship between the individual and society.¹²²

In a pedagogical concept of recognition, Prenzel draws Honneth’s segments of love, legal equality, and social esteem, which appear to be relevant for interactions in the school context. According to Prenzel, these three attitudes help to perceive differences while simultaneously ensuring that differences are not overemphasised, otherness is not controlled, and stereotypical treatment of national or religious origins are avoided.¹²³ Teachers who consciously implement these basic traits are certainly also good role models for their pupils; this can promote skills and aptitudes in students.

How can such a pedagogical reflection of the socioethical approach be implemented at the ethical interaction level of pupils?

119 Cf. “Studie Ergebnisse und Länderprofile: Muslime in Europa – Integriert, aber nicht akzeptiert?,” *Religion Monitor* (Bertelsmann Foundation/Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2017), 58.

120 “Studie Ergebnisse und Länderprofile,” 58.

121 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, “Vom pragmatischen, ethischen und moralischen Gebrauch der praktischen Vernunft,” in *Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik* (Frankfurt, 1991), 106.

122 Cf. Werner Nothurf, “Anerkennung,” in *Handbuch interkulturelle Kommunikation und Kompetenz. Grundbegriffe – Theorien – Anwendungsfelder*, eds. Jürgen Straub, Arne Weidemann, and Dors Weidemann (Stuttgart, 2007), 110.

123 See Käte Meyer-Drawe, “Die Beziehung zum Anderen beim Kind. Merleau Pontys Konzeption kindlicher Sozialität,” *Bildung und Erziehung* 37, 2 (1984):164, 167; and Yasemin Karakaşoğlu, Mona Massumi, and Sabine Jacobsen, “Interkulturelle Öffnung im Spiegel von Schulkultur. Überlegungen aus einem Theorie-Praxis-Dialog,” in *Diversity in der LehrerInnenbildung. Internationale Dimensionen der Vielfalt in Forschung und Praxis*, eds. Sebastian Barsch, Nina Glutsch, and Mona Massumi (Münster/New York, 2017), 217–238.

If social plurality is reflected in the classroom, then students need reinforcement in those competencies that protect them from the opposites of recognition, namely discrimination, bullying, contempt, and rejection.

3.4 Intercultural Pedagogy

According to Maria Castro Varela and Birgit Jagusch, the consideration of intercultural aspects in pedagogy is primarily understood as a further development or reaction to approaches of foreigners, and later, multicultural pedagogy, which were fundamentally based on deficit-oriented and assimilationist approaches.¹²⁴ There are many different approaches to intercultural education which cannot be covered fully here.¹²⁵ However, one thing that these approaches have in common is that they are based on a “reflexive understanding of culture and its functions in the educational context and in other social contexts.”¹²⁶ Intercultural pedagogy, therefore, aims to recognise the diversity of cultural identities, whereby differences are seen as social constructions (including those that have become historical) and social conditions are reflected upon—in particular mechanisms of disadvantage or favouritism, based on ethnic-cultural characteristics.¹²⁷ As Kiesel and Volz explain in their essay, intercultural (social) work relates to problems of the prerequisites for a good lifestyle and can therefore be understood as a hermeneutics of lifestyle.¹²⁸ Intercultural pedagogy should be recognised, in particular, for the

124 Maria do Mar Castro Varela and Birgit Jagusch, “Geschlechtergerechtigkeit in der interkulturellen Jugendarbeit,” in *“Rassismus – eine Jugendsünde?” Aktuelle antirassistische und interkulturelle Perspektiven der Jugendarbeit. Tagungsdokumentation*, Informations- und Dokumentationszentrum für Antirassismusbearbeit (Düsseldorf, 2006), 45–55.

125 For an introduction, see Gogolin and Krüger-Potratz, *Einführung in die interkulturelle Pädagogik* (Leverkusen, 2020).

126 Gogolin and Krüger-Potratz, *Einführung in die interkulturelle Pädagogik*, 134.

127 Cf. Ingrid Gogolin, Ursula Neumann, and Hans-Joachim Roth, “Förderung von Kindern und Jugendlichen mit Migrationshintergrund,” Gutachten für die Bund-Länder-Kommission Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung (Bonn, 2003).

128 Doron Kiesel and Fritz Rüdiger Volz, “‘Anerkennung und Intervention.’ Moral und Ethik als komplementäre Dimensionen interkultureller Kompetenz,” in

fact that practitioners reflect on their own biases and prejudices in encounters with others, and where sociocultural orientation patterns and self-conceptions clash, they proceed with caution in ethical judgements, i.e., intercultural pedagogy enables self-reflection, coping patterns, and self-transformation.¹²⁹ However, it fails to specify how these skills are to be acquired and only focuses on the intercultural context.

Intercultural competence is one of the key qualifications that have become increasingly important not only in professional fields but also in private and family life.¹³⁰ Intercultural competence has been regarded as a central dimension of general education at least since the 1996 resolution of the German Conference of Education Ministers on “Intercultural Formation and Education,” and is now a component of most curricula, learning and education plans at the primary level and, accordingly, at secondary level I. However, there is as yet no empirical support for the programme of intercultural formation and education.¹³¹ Personal intercultural competency refers to knowledge-based abilities and skills in the sense of an individual disposition, which is brought to bear in a way that is mediated by the actor’s interpretation of the context and situation.¹³²

The specific situation of people with a migrant background may be of intersubjective importance and call for an appropriate approach, but it is questionable whether this is sufficient in a society that is now highly culturally and religiously pluralistic and has different cultural self-images.¹³³ It is also difficult to impart basic knowledge about a particular culture and religion in a value-free manner. Religious forms of culture must also be taken into account.

Interkulturelle Kompetenz und pädagogische Professionalität, ed. Georg Auernheimer (Wiesbaden, 2013), 77.

129 Cf. Kiesel and Volz, “Anerkennung und Intervention,” 76ff.

130 Cf. Jürgen Straub, “Kompetenz,” in *Handbuch interkulturelle Kommunikation und Kompetenz*, 35.

131 Cf. Isabell Diehm, Melanie Kuhn, and Claudia Machold, “Der Umgang mit ethnischer Heterogenität im Anfangsunterricht. Prämissen und Implikationen Interkultureller Pädagogik und ihr anhaltendes Empiriedefizit,” in *Sachunterricht im Anfangsunterricht. Lernen im Anschluss nach dem Kindergarten*, ed. Eva Gläser (Baltmannsweiler, 2007), 177–191.

132 Cf. Straub, “Kompetenz,” 39.

133 See Naika Foroutan, “Muslimbilder in Deutschland. Wahrnehmungen und Ausgrenzungen in der Integrationsdebatte,” FES Dokumentation (Bonn, 2012).

Intercultural education should therefore not be blind to religion. The diversity of religions and denominations, each of which is practised in its own way in everyday life, makes things even more difficult. Knowledge about the effectiveness and influence of culture hardly supports the process of human sociability.¹³⁴ Knowing something does not mean knowing or even mastering its performance. Reflecting on cultural contexts does not initiate a lasting ability to react sensitively in new culturally specific situations, nor does it necessarily bring about positive attitudes towards plurality. Repeated practice, i.e., confrontation with unfamiliar behaviour, is required in order to learn and gain a certain degree of confidence. However, this must be preceded by an open attitude and willingness that makes it possible to engage with a new environment and other people. This learning process is fraught with difficulties. Culture is known to be dynamic and therefore changeable.¹³⁵ For this reason, intercultural education in general, but also intercultural competence in particular, can neither capture nor do justice to the individually divergent multiple cultural references of people. In any case, intercultural education was criticised in the 1990s for concentrating on particular social groups and focusing solely on them.¹³⁶ Under the current conditions of increased cultural diversity, criticism regarding the favouring or disadvantaging of certain groups in the school curriculum is likely to intensify. In addition, an explicit focus on “other” cultures creates the danger of perpetuating or (re)constructing the perception of migrant people as “foreigners”, thus continuing *othering*, and thereby shaping the way we live together.¹³⁷ Added to this is the mostly negative media discourse about migrant groups in society, which exerts a considerable influence on our attitudes. The habitual way of dealing with people of other faiths and cultural backgrounds, possibly

134 Cf. Stojanov, *Bildung und Anerkennung*, 9.

135 Cf. Jürgen Straub, “Kulturwissenschaftliche Psychologie,” in *Paradigmen und Disziplinen. Reihe Handbuch der Kulturwissenschaften*, vol. 2, eds. Friedrich Jäger and Jürgen Straub (Stuttgart/Weimar, 2004), 581–591.

136 Cf. Paul Mecheril, *Einführung in die Migrationspädagogik* (Weinheim/Basel, 2004), *passim*.

137 The term *othering* was coined by the postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and refers to the production of an “other” through imperial discourse. See, for example, Iman Attia and Mariam Popal (eds.), *BeDeutungen dekolonisieren: Spuren von (antimuslimischem) Rassismus* (Münster, 2018), 19.

characterised by indifference, can suddenly change depending on the prevailing media mood; rifts can be torn open and differences (re)defined, scandalised, and ethnically and/or religiously charged. Even in established neighbourhoods, this leads to problems where there were none before.¹³⁸ “A racist division of social space is obviously very easy to stage.”¹³⁹

The aim of intercultural education was to uncover structures of social disadvantage and ways to realise equal opportunities regardless of ethnic, socioeconomic, and gender affiliation.¹⁴⁰ Against this background, it offers solutions, albeit only a few, as to how children can learn to deal with migration-related plurality depending on the context.¹⁴¹ Practising how to deal with cultural differences is likely to prove very difficult in the everyday school environment.¹⁴² There is always the danger of ascribing cultural otherness, with recourse to previous experiences, making attributions and stereotypes that hardly correspond to the self-image of another person. In this way, acquired specific techniques of interaction or forms of behaviour in dealing with particular cultural ways of life can generalise and codify social categorisations, if not even essentialise specially created markings, and stage them as components of human nature.¹⁴³

This means that intercultural pedagogy and the intercultural competence acquired and deepened with its help should enable constructive communication and avoid ethnically-oriented communica-

138 See Wolf-Dieterich Bukow, “Wie viel Fremdheit verträgt das Land? Vom selbstverständlichen Umgang mit einer längst alltäglichen Fremdheit,” in *Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Pädagogik. Aktuelle Entwicklungen in Theorie, Empirie und Praxis*, eds. Yasemin Karakaşoğlu and Julian Lüddecke (Münster, 2004), 186.

139 Bukow, “Wie viel Fremdheit verträgt das Land?,” 186.

140 Cf. Sven Ernstson and Christine Meyer (eds.), *Praxis geschlechtersensibler und interkultureller Bildung* (Wiesbaden, 2013), 12.

141 Cf. Diehm, Kuhn, and Machold, “Der Umgang mit ethnischer Heterogenität im Anfangsunterricht,” 183.

142 Cf. Monika Tautz, *Interreligiöses Lernen im Religionsunterricht. Menschen und Ethos im Islam und Christentum* (Stuttgart, 2007), 70.

143 Cf. Aurora Rodonò, “Ambiguitätsdingsbums. Or: Oder: Unordnung aushalten, Rassismus bekämpfen im (ethnologischen) Museum,” in *Mehrdeutigkeit gestalten*, eds. Schnurr et al., 275.

tion.¹⁴⁴ This skill should enable people to react in the best possible way when problems that can be characterised as culture-specific arise. In this sense, competence means a quality, ability, or trait that enables people to cope successfully and efficiently with challenges in complex situations.¹⁴⁵ Understood in this way, competency encompasses much more than the ability to respond appropriately to culturally (and religiously) different people. Following the general concept of competence, the consideration of all factors and aspects of a situation is required, with cultural otherness and strangeness recognised as one of many aspects.¹⁴⁶ This makes virtue ethics didactics compatible with competency discourse.

3.5 *Virtue Competence?* The Consequences of Virtue Ethics: Considerations for the Discourse on Competencies in Educational Theory

In the above discussion, there is evidence of strong convergence between the meaning of the terms *competence* and *virtue*. It can therefore be asked whether the concept of *virtue*, with our working definition on which this book is based, can have an impact on current educational discourses, or whether it can inspire and sharpen the focus on the idea of cultivating the self in the context of personality development. I will not go into all the similarities and differences in detail, but focus on what I consider to be the fundamental difference and convergence of the two concepts relevant to this issue.

The report “Zur Entwicklung nationaler Bildungsstandards” (“On the Development of National Educational Standards”), established

144 Cf. Mohammed Heidari, “Lernen durch Konflikte im Kontext des interkulturellen Zusammenlebens am Beispiel der Migranten und Migrantinnen aus muslimischen Herkunftsländern in Deutschland,” in *Lernprozess Christen Muslime. Gesellschaftliche Kontexte – theologische Grundlagen – Begegnungsfelder*, eds. Andreas Renz and Stephan Leimgruber (Münster, 2002), 252.

145 Cf. Hanspeter Maurer and Beat Gurzeler, *Handbuch Kompetenzen. Strategien zur Förderung überfachlicher Kompetenzen* (Bern, 2005), 148.

146 See Franz E. Weinert, “Vergleichende Leistungsmessung in Schulen – eine umstrittene Selbstverständlichkeit,” in *Leistungsmessungen in Schulen*, ed. Franz E. Weinert (Weinheim/Basel, 2002), 17–31.

a semantic proximity between *virtue* and *competence*. Although conceptual implications are not examined, the report addresses the specific question of whether certain secondary virtues can be evaluated as objectives of educational work.¹⁴⁷

Here, our definitions of terms are recalled in order to formulate convergence and difference. Franz Weinert's definition of competence in educational theory is not uncontroversial, but nevertheless enjoys great approval and is often cited as a basis, which is why it is included here.¹⁴⁸ For Weinert,

Competences are the cognitive abilities and skills that are available to or can be learnt through them in order to solve certain problems, as well as the associated motivational, volitional, and social readiness and abilities to be able to use the solutions to problems successfully and responsibly in variable situations.¹⁴⁹

According to the above-mentioned characteristics, competences can be understood as permanent and specific dispositions that are acquired in the course of educational and upbringing processes, and enable people to cope with different challenges and life situations.¹⁵⁰ According to this definition, many facets come together to form a competency, such as knowledge, cognitive abilities, understanding, ability, action, experience, and motivation. A certain ability is demonstrated in a successful performance or concretisation, i.e., in the actions of the person; this means that someone is competent *in* something.¹⁵¹

This allows competencies to be sorted and categorised according to various facets, such as media, social, judgement, methodological, or personal skills, as well as key competencies. Technical and professional competences relate to the ability to complete tasks using subject-specific knowledge, whereas key competences are essential

147 See Eckhard Klieme et al., "Zur Entwicklung nationaler Bildungsstandards," Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Berlin, 2003), 63ff.

148 Cf. Roeger, *Philosophieunterricht*, 111.

149 Weinert, "Vergleichende Leistungsmessung in Schulen," 27ff.

150 Cf. Eckhard Klieme and Johannes Hartig, "Kompetenzkonzepte in den Sozialwissenschaften und im erziehungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs," in *Kompetenzdiagnostik*. Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaften 10 (8), eds. Manfred Prenzel, Ingrid Gogolin, and Hein-Hermann Krüger (Wiesbaden, 2007), 21.

151 See Kauffeld, *Kompetenzen messen, bewerten, entwickeln*.

for the personal and social development of individuals in a modern society and enable flexibility of action.¹⁵²

Human behaviour and human actions fundamentally allow conclusions to be drawn about (moral) attitudes and intentions.¹⁵³ A virtuous lifestyle correlates with an intention to act.

If one acts as a virtuous person would act, but with a different intention, then one would achieve the same immediate goal, but the action would not be virtuous because of the lack of intention. In this case, there would be a different psychological disposition with the same performance.¹⁵⁴

For virtues, the character, and thus also the intention and motivation of the person acting, is sufficient. That is why the concept of virtue asks

how a person should be in order to be considered a good person. Virtues are therefore attitudes and behaviours linked to a person's identity that enable them to act appropriately in the respective context.¹⁵⁵

Character virtues, to which Pauer-Studer alludes, could thus tend to correspond to social and self-competences in the sense of personal qualities in terms of competence theory. There are certain virtues, such as the *dianoethical* virtues described by Aristotle, which are instrumental or artisanal virtues that appear functionally equivalent to social competence but constitute a broader spectrum of action than social skills from an educational theory perspective. The concept of virtue does not refer to individual skills for successfully coping with the world but to an overall view of a good life. According to Swanton's definition, the concepts of competence and virtue have a family resemblance in the Wittgensteinian sense, i.e., they equip

152 Cf. Lothar Böhnisch, "Familie und Bildung," in *Handbuch Bildungsforschung*, ed. Rudolf Tippelt and Bernhard Schmidt (Wiesbaden, 2009), 343. Based on this idea, a competency orientation in educational discourse gives the impression of a renaissance of personality or character development, which has basically been inherent to the educational mission up to now—as will be discussed below. Cf. Roland Reichenbach, *Philosophie der Bildung und Erziehung. Eine Einführung* (Stuttgart, 2007), 69.

153 Cf. Herlinde Pauer-Studer, *Einführung in die Ethik* (Vienna, 2010), 102.

154 Roeger, *Philosophieunterricht*, 142.

155 Herlinde Pauer-Studer, "Tugendethik," in *Handbuch Philosophie und Ethik*, vol. II, eds. Julian Nida-Rümelin, Irina Spiegel, and Markus Thiedemann (Paderborn, 2017), 79.

people to react *well* in a context-specific, situation-appropriate, and sensitive manner.¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, competences are not part of an overall conception of the morally good life.¹⁵⁷ The concept of virtue means more than a mastery of skills or craftsmanship, while competence is ultimately a specific skill or *ability*.¹⁵⁸ The concept of virtue brings into play the connotation of the ethically good, which is not included in the concept of competency, i.e., the concept of virtue cannot be replaced by the concept of competency, and they cannot be used synonymously, as this would significantly curtail the concept of virtue. This is why the neologism “virtue competence” seems superfluous. Its use would result in a constitutive loss of content on the part of virtue ethics and in an empirically intangible quantity on the part of competence theory.

3.6 Summary

First of all, it should be noted that dealing with values and values-based education indicates a possible direction for a discussion of virtuous values that can be helpful for a good life for both the individual and the community in pluralistic environments. While virtues essentially answer the question, *Who is good?*, values answer the question, *What is important?*

Pedagogically, advanced recognition concepts focus conceptually on the acquisition of skills that enable mutual recognition, as pedagogical theories of recognition assume that “relationships of recognition are a moral necessity.”¹⁵⁹ They emphasise the relevance of forms of recognition such as love, respect, and social appreciation. This provides the first fundamental indications as to which personal characteristics are required for appreciative interaction in a highly differentiated social composition, which enable people as a whole to enter into an (ideally) domination-free dialogue with each other, and to treat each other ethically and with dignity. This concretises

156 Cf. Kauffeld, *Kompetenzen messen, bewerten, entwickeln*, 8ff.

157 Similar criticism is also expressed by Dallmann, “Eine tugendethische Annäherung an Begriff und Pädagogik der Kompetenzen,” 31.

158 Cf. Roeger, *Philosophieunterricht*, 144.

159 Reisenauer and Ulseß-Schurda, *Anerkennung in der Schule*, 23.

the search for personal qualities that are considered crucial for an (ethically) prosperous and good life in a pluralistic society.

Intercultural education conceptually focuses on the acquisition of intercultural competence. It considers personal attitudes such as respect and attentiveness to be the basis for peaceful interactions. *Intercultural competence* alone is unlikely to be relevant to the present research question, but it has opened up a fundamental question for the discussion here: How can processes of recognition be favoured in schools? What human resources are necessary for someone to be accepted for who he or she is? This has led to educational theory discussions of competences in comparison to virtues, which consequently means that the concepts of competence and virtue have overlaps. Convictions about what constitutes a good life for the individual and for the community are closely linked to a person's interpretation of the world, their worldview. Religions offer such an overall view of the good life, i.e., a religiously embedded perspective could be compelling for an educational theory—developed decidedly in differentiation from religious perspectives. Against this background, the meaning of the concept of virtue will now be further developed and concretised.

